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Article
A Tour de Horizon of Issues on the Agenda of the
Mercenaries Working Group*
Gabor Rona**
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION: THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE MILITARY AND
SECURITY CONTRACTORS1
Despite the common use of the term mercenaries to
describe private military security contractors (PMSCs) and the
fact that in some cases PMSC employees meet the criteria of
mercenaries, international instruments that govern mercenary
activities do not normally apply to PMSCs. This is because
employees of PMSCs do not usually meet the legal definition of
mercenaries set out under the First Additional Protocol to the
four Geneva Conventions or the International Convention
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries.
For example,
 Although some PMSC employees are reported to have
taken part in hostilities, the majority do not conduct
combat operations;
 PMSC employees are often nationals or residents of one
of the State parties to the conflict;
 PMSC employees sometimes operate within the military
*
The full title of the Working Group is “The Working Group established
by the Commission on Human Rights on the use of mercenaries as a means of
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to
self-determination.” Both Mercenaries and Private Military and Security
Contractors fall within the mandate of the Working Group.
**
Member, Mercenaries Working Group. This Article was prepared for
the Minnesota Journal of International Law’s 2013 Symposium. To see a video
recording of the discussion that took place, please see the Minnesota Journal
of International Law’s website, http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913.
1. This section draws heavily from Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC],
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
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chain of command and are considered as members of
the armed forces of the party to the conflict.
In addition to international humanitarian law, human
rights law provides protections both in armed conflict
situations and when PMSCs operate outside the context of
armed conflict.2 For example, human rights law would govern
PMSC involvement in operations such as disaster relief or
humanitarian aid situations that may also pose serious risks to
human rights.3
While PMSCs and their employees are not normally
recognized as direct subjects of human rights law, States are
obliged to take appropriate measures and to exercise due
diligence to prevent, punish, and investigate human rights
violations and redress the harm caused by human rights
violations involving those caused by PMSCs.4 Although States
are obligated to ensure that PMSCs and their employees
respect both international humanitarian law and human rights
law, this system has not proved effective in providing
accountability for victims. In the last several years, we have
seen various obstacles to accountability that suggest there are
certain gaps at the international level that still need to be
addressed.
II. THE MERCENARY PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY
CONFLICTS
A. UPDATE ON RECENT ACTIVITIES OF MERCENARIES5
The recent increase in mercenary activities in Africa serves
as a reminder that mercenaries continue to pose a serious
threat to the enjoyment of human rights.
1. Use of Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire
Presidential elections were held in October and November
2010 in Côte d’Ivoire.6 After some uncertainty about the final
2. See The Montreux Document, Sept. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. This section draws heavily from Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to
Self-Determination, Third Comm., Rep. on its 67th Sess., ¶¶ 6–12, U.N. Doc.
A/66/317 (Aug. 22, 2011).
6. Rebecca Blackwell, Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ivoryc
oast/index.htm.
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result, Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner of those
elections in early December 2010.7 However, the outgoing
President, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede defeat until he
was arrested on 11 April 2011. 8 For several months, he
allegedly recruited Liberian mercenaries to consolidate his
power base and attack the supporters of the President Elect.
There were some reports that pro-Ouattara supporters had also
recruited Liberian mercenaries.9 About 4,500 Liberian
mercenaries were reportedly active in Côte d’Ivoire, mainly in
the western part of the country bordering Liberia.10
Since the election, there have been numerous allegations
that Liberian mercenaries were involved in serious human
rights violations, including summary executions, forced
disappearances, rape, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, arson, pillaging,
and looting.11 Some mercenaries were reportedly arrested upon
their return to Liberia.12 It is unclear, however, whether any
mercenaries have been brought to justice in either Liberia or
Côte d’Ivoire.
The Working Group has taken the following actions in
response to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.13 On 19 January
2011, it sent allegation letters to both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia
requesting further information on mercenary activities in Côte
d’Ivoire, and on measures taken to prevent such activities and
to hold those mercenaries involved in human rights violations
accountable.14 To date, the Working Group has not received a
response to its letters.15
On 28 January 2011, the Working Group requested a visit
7. Id.
8. See Rep. of the Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on
Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 17th Sess., May 30–June 17,
2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/48 (June 14, 2011).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Rep. of the Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on
Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 17th Sess., May 30–June 17,
2011, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/49 (June 14, 2011).
12. See, e.g., Reuters, Ivory Coast Mercenary ‘Bob Marley’ Arrested in
Liberia, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/15/ivorycoast-liberia-mercenary-bob-marley-arrested (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).
13. See Communications Rep. of Special Procedures, Human Rights
Council, Rep. on its 18th Sess., Sept. 12–30, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/51
(Sept. 9, 2011).
14. Id.
15. Id.
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to Côte d’Ivoire. In this regard, the Human Rights Council
acknowledged the standing invitation issued by President
Ouattara to all special procedures mandate holders, including
the Working Group on the use of mercenaries, to conduct visits
to the country.16 The Working Group hoped to conduct such a
visit by the end of 2011, but has not yet been able to do so.
On 1 April 2011, the Working Group issued a press release,
jointly with several other special procedures mandate holders,
in which it expressed concern about the involvement of
English-speaking mercenaries in attacks against civilians and
recalled that the recruitment of such mercenaries is prohibited
under international law.17
The Working Group notes that there is increasing concern
regarding mercenary activities in West Africa generally, and
growing interest in developing a regional approach to this
problem.
In May 2011, President Ouattara called for such a regional
approach, noting that many Liberian mercenaries who were
active in Côte d’Ivoire had returned to Liberia, from where they
may move on to Sierra Leone and then Guinea.18 The
Secretary-General has also favored the development of a subregional strategy for addressing the mercenary problem.19 On
20 June 2011, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) called upon its member States to monitor
movements across their borders, with a view to arresting
perpetrators of crime and preventing mercenary activities.20
On 30 November 2011, Laurent Gbagbo, the former
President of Côte d’Ivoire, was transferred to the detention
center of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The
16. See G.A. Res. 16/25, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/16/25 (Apr. 13, 2011).
17. Press Release, Human Rights Council, Côte d’Ivoire: UN rights
experts call on all parties to spare civilians and stop human rights violations,
U.N.
Press
Release
(Apr.
1,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1090
8&LangID=E.
18. See Ivory Coast: Alassane Ouattara Warns of Mercenaries, BBC,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13500677?print=true.
19. See Twenty-eighth Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N.
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, SCOR, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/2011/387 (June 24, 2011).
20. See Press Release, Economic Community of West African States
[ECOWAS], ECOWAS Commission Expresses Concern over Indiscriminate
Movement of Weapons, Mercenary Fighters in West Africa, ECOWAS Press
Release
104/2011
(June
20,
2011),
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=104&lang=en&annee=2011
(last
visited Feb. 13, 2013).
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Hague.21 Mr. Gbagbo was charged with four counts of crimes
against humanity for acts committed during the post-election
violence in Cote d’Ivoire.22 The acts forming the basis of the
charges against Mr. Gbagbo were allegedly committed by the
Security and Defense Forces,23 and reinforced by pro-Gbagbo
youth militia and mercenaries.24
Despite the removal of Gbagbo, mercenaries continue to
pose a serious human rights and security problem in Côte
d’Ivoire and their activities should be addressed in a systematic
and comprehensive manner. Several reported incidents
highlight this need.25
On 13 April 2011, Liberian authorities captured the
notorious Liberian mercenary, Isaac Chegbo (also known by his
noms de guerre “Bob Marley” and “Child Could Die”), who
allegedly helped orchestrate two massacres in which more than
120 men, women, and children were killed in and around
Bloléquin, Côte d’Ivoire, on 22 and 25 March 2011. 26 Chegbo
reportedly acknowledged that he had been hired as a
mercenary to fight the new regular armed forces, the Forces
républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire, as created on 17 March 2011,
and to fight as a mercenary in support of pro-Gbagbo forces.
Despite this admission, Liberian authorities failed to prosecute
him and he was released on bail by the Monrovia Circuit Court
on 1 February 2012. 27 The Working Group notes with concern
that despite the attempts of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia
21. Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Third
Comm., Rep. on its 67th Sess., ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/67/340 (Aug. 30, 2012)
[hereinafter Use of Mercenaries, 2012].
22. Id.
23. The Security and Defence Forces were the former regular armed
forces of the Gbagbo regime.
24. Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 22 at ¶ 22.
25. Id. ¶ 23.
26. U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Rep., transmitted by letter dated
Nov. 30, 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established
pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the
President of the Security Council, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. S/2011/757; see also They
Killed Them Like It Was Nothing: The Need for Justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s PostElection Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/cdi1011WebUpload.pdf.
27. U.N. S.C., Letter dated Jun. 15, 2012 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003)
Concerning Liberia Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 62–
63. U.N. Doc. S/2012/448 (Jun. 20, 2012) [hereinafter S.C. Jun. 15, 2012
Letter].
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to obtain clarification, it remains unclear whether the charges
against Chegbo were dropped or whether he was released on
bail.28
Next, in January 2012, Liberian police arrested 73 Ivorians
and one Liberian national identified as a mercenary recruiter. 29
They were suspected of planning an attack on Côte d’Ivoire.30
The report of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia indicates that
the County Attorney of Grand Gedeh did not properly
investigate the charges and precipitously decided to release all
74 detainees on 20 February 2012.31
A third incident occurred on 24 April 2012, when a group of
approximately 20 men attacked the Ivorian village of Sakré. 32
According to the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, the attackers
were Ivorians and Liberians aiming to create instability and
loot property.33 Seven civilians were killed, two were injured,
several houses were destroyed, and more than 3,000 civilians
fled to villages nearby.34 The Forces républicaines de Côte
d’Ivoire were able to capture four attackers, all of whom are
Ivorian and all of whom are currently in custody.35
The Working Group is particularly concerned about reports
that armed militias, hostile to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire,
recruited and trained Liberian children between the ages of 14
and 17 to carry out cross-border raids.36
In June 2012, seven UN peacekeepers were killed in Côte
d’Ivoire.37 In its press statement on the incident, the UN
Security Council expressed concern about the “prevailing
insecurity in western Côte d’Ivoire and the border area, and
continued cross-border movements of armed elements,
28. Id.
29. Id. ¶ 67; U.N. Secretary-General, Special report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc.
S/2012/186 (Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Côte d’Ivoire Special Report].
30. S.C. Jun. 15, 2012 Letter, supra note 27, at ¶ 67.
31. Id. ¶¶ 67–77.
32. Id. ¶ 78.
33. Id. ¶¶ 78–79.
34. Id. ¶ 80.
35. Id.
36. Liberia: Ivorian Government Foes Wage, Plot Attacks: Investigate,
Prosecute War Criminals from Côte d’Ivoire Conflict in Liberia, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Jun. 6, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/06/liberiaivorian-government-foes-wage-plot-attacks.
37. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Monthly Forecast: Jul. 2012, at
24 (Jun. 29, 2012), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/July%202012%20Forecast.pdf.
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including militias and mercenaries.”38
So far no national strategy has been developed in Côte
d’Ivoire or in Liberia to address the issues identified by the
Security Council.39 The largely uncontrolled cross-border
movement of armed elements, possibly including mercenaries,
poses serious risks to the stability of the region, and to the
human rights of the populations living in the border areas.40
The Minister of Human Rights and Civil Liberties of Côte
d’Ivoire met with the Working Group in March 2012 and
indicated that his Government was prepared to receive a
country visit. On 25 June 2012, the Working Group reiterated
its previous request to visit Côte d’Ivoire by year’s end.41
2. Use of Mercenaries in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya42
Peaceful demonstrations by Libyan citizens seeking
political change in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya began in
February 2011. Within a few weeks, there were allegations that
foreign mercenaries were being used by the Libyan authorities
to violently suppress political protests. The Working Group has
noted that this alleged use of mercenaries by the Government
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya departs from the traditional
practices witnessed in the Twentieth Century and set out in the
International Convention on the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries,43 adopted by the General
Assembly in 1989. Traditionally, mercenaries have been
recruited to either participate in an armed conflict or overthrow
a Government. The March 2004 attempted coup in Equatorial
Guinea offers an example of the traditional use of mercenaries.
In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the other hand, mercenaries
were not used to overthrow the Government: allegedly, they
were used by the Government to quell civilian protests. Such
38. Press Release, President of the Security Council, Deadly Attack on
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, U.N. Press Release SC/10668 (Jun.
11, 2012).
39. Côte d’Ivoire Special Report, supra note 29, ¶ 27.
40. Id. ¶ 25.
41. Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 24, ¶ 30.
42. The following paragraphs draw heavily from U.N. Secretary-General,
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶ 13–20, U.N. Doc.
A/66/317 (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Use of Mercenaries, 2011], & Use of
Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 24, ¶¶ 31–38.
43. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing
and Training of Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 37789.
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mercenaries were believed to have been recruited from
neighboring African countries and, possibly, also from Eastern
Europe.44
In relation to allegations concerning the use of
mercenaries, the International Commission of Inquiry,
established in March 2011 by the Human Rights Council to
investigate alleged violations of international human rights law
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, concluded that foreign
nationals have taken part in the conflict, including
perpetrating human rights violations, particularly on the side
of Government forces. However, the Commission of Inquiry
noted that there is some uncertainty about whether these
foreign nationals meet the international definition of a
mercenary. The Working Group agreed with this assessment.
Further information is required as to how, when and for what
purpose these troops were recruited. For example, the Working
Group does not know whether the foreign nationals were
resident in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya prior to their
recruitment by the Government, whether they were engaged as
part of an existing foreign military exchange, when exactly they
were recruited and for what purpose (for example, to suppress
the demonstrations or to take part in the subsequent armed
conflict).45
What is clear, however, is that where mercenaries have
been involved in human rights violations against the civilian
population, mercenaries must be held accountable.46 In
response to the events unfolding in the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, the Working Group issued a press release on 22
February 2011, jointly with several other special procedures
mandate holders, in which it expressed grave concern about the
alleged involvement of foreign “mercenaries” in the killing of
protesters.47
On 23 February 2011, the Working Group also sent an
urgent appeal to the Government of the Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, jointly with several other special procedures
44. Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of
int’l human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17th Sess., ¶ 194, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (Jun. 1, 2011).
45. Id. ¶ 201.
46. See id. ¶ 192.
47. Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Libya:
“Stop the Massacre”–UN Experts (Feb. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1074
7&LangID=E.
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mandate holders, in which it expressed concern about the death
of civilians and the excessive use of force against protesters by
security forces in the context of peaceful demonstrations. The
Working Group requested, inter alia, detailed information on
measures taken to ensure that foreign armed individuals were
held accountable for any possible human rights violations. No
response has been received to date.48
The Human Rights Council held a special session on the
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 25 February 2011.
The joint statement of special procedures mandate holders was
delivered by the Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the
use of mercenaries.49 In the statement, the mandate holders
expressed concern about the authorities’ enlistment of
“mercenaries” from other countries to support the crackdown
on demonstrators in Benghazi and other cities.50
On 26 February 2011, the Security Council, in paragraph 4
of its resolution 1970 (2011), decided unanimously to refer the
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court. Pre-Trial Chamber I of the
ICC concluded that there were reasonable grounds for believing
that three Libyan officials were criminally responsible for
indirectly committing crimes against humanity (murder and
persecution). Arrest warrants were issued on 27 June 2011.
The Office of the Prosecutor has reportedly gathered direct
evidence on the role of Saif al-Islam, son of Moammar Qadhafi,
in recruiting mercenaries.51
On 17 March 2011, the Security Council, in paragraph 16
of its resolution 1973 (2011), spoke against the continuing flows
of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and called
48. U.N. Human Rights Council, Communications Report of Special
Procedures, 58, A/HRC/18/51 (Sept. 9, 2011).
49. José-Luis Gomez del Prado, Chair of the Working Group on the use of
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise
of the rights of peoples to self-determination, Statement Delivered on Behalf of
All Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the United Nations Human Rights
Council at the Fifteenth Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the
Human Rights Situation on the Libyan Jamahiriya (Feb. 25, 2011), available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1076
1&LangID=E.
50. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the High Commissioner Under
Human Rights Council Resolution S-15/1, ¶¶ 7, 17, A/HRC/18/51 (June 7,
2011).
51. The cited material draws heavily from Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra
note 24.
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upon all Member States to prevent the provision of armed
mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Since the
Working Group’s report of November 2011, Saif al-Islam
Gaddafi, the fugitive son of Libya’s former head who had been
accused of involvement in mercenary activities by the ICC was
captured.52 In February 2012 the Security Council voted
unanimously to refer the matter to the ICC, based on the arrest
warrant that had previously been issued by the court. The
Libyan Government rejected the surrender request. The
Prosecutor of the ICC has asked the court to report Libya to the
Security Council for failing to turn over Saif al-Islam.
On 17 March 2012, Mauritania arrested the Gaddafi-era
intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senouss. Al-Senoussi reportedly
orchestrated the recruitment and operations of mercenaries in
Libya. Mauritania has taken the position that it will conduct
its own investigation before considering extradition requests
from Libya, the ICC, and France.53
Beyond the responsibility of high-level Gaddafi government
officials for mercenary recruitment, a major issue that remains
unresolved in Libya is the status of a number of foreign fighters
who primarily came from other parts of Africa and who fought
alongside the Gaddafi forces. In its March 2012 report, the
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (established in
March 2011 by the Human Rights Council to investigate
alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya)
reiterated its view that while it was clear that fighters of
foreign descent fought alongside Gaddafi’s forces, it was
unclear whether these fighters fell within the definition of
“mercenary” under the UN Convention against Mercenaries or
under the OAU Convention of Mercenaries. The main reason
for this uncertainty was the “lack of information about the
terms under and purpose for which they were contracted.”54
Among the categories of fighters that the Commission
found would likely not be categorized as mercenary were: an
organized group of Sudanese fighters who were brought in by
the Gaddafi government; a group of Tuareg fighters who were
recruited from different regions of Libya; and various Libyan
nationals or residents who were originally from Chad, Mali, or
Niger.55 “The Commission of Inquiry also noted that the terms
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶

32.
33.
34.
35.
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‘foreigners’ and ‘mercenaries’ were used by the interviewees
interchangeably to describe persons with dark skin who had
taken part either in the conflict or in suppressing
demonstrations against the Qadhafi regime.”56
Although it is far from clear that the foreign fighters in
Libya were in fact mercenaries, they are being held as
mercenaries at various facilities around the country.57 The
Working Group is concerned that, as reported by the
Commission of Inquiry, thuwar forces have been involved in the
arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of perceived
Gaddafi loyalists, security officers, alleged mercenaries, and
members of the former government and detainees have been
arrested without a warrant, without being told the reasons for
their arrest, and without a reasonable suspicion that they have
been individually involved in criminal activity.58
“The Working Group is also concerned, that according to
the Commission a number of detainees are being held outside
any legal framework in unacknowledged centres.”59 Finally, the
Working Group noted the concerns “expressed by the
Commission of Inquiry regarding the conditions of detention of
these fighters, including the maltreatment that is still taking
place in centres under the control of local military councils and
security committees and the fact that access to family members
remains limited and that “access to lawyers is still not
afforded.”60
In order to examine the situation of those held as
mercenaries and to provide the Government of Libya with its
recommendations on how to address this situation, the
Working Group has expressed its willingness to the
Government of Libya to visit the country. As noted before, the
visit was scheduled to take place from 21 to 25 May 2012, but
the Working Group had to postpone its mission to a later date.
The Working Group hopes to carry out its visit in 2013, as
agreed to by the Government of Libya.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 36.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶¶ 36–37.

RONA Article 5.1.13

2013]

5/21/2013 12:02 AM

MERCENARIES WORKING GROUP

335

B. MERCENARIES: A RECURRING AND EVOLVING
PHENOMENON 61
As exemplified by the attempted coup by mercenaries in
Equatorial Guinea in 2004, mercenaries remain active in many
parts of the world, and have devastating effects on human
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination.
Recently, rather than being hired to overthrow or
undermine Governments, mercenaries have been employed by
Governments to suppress opposition movements. The Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya is a prime recent example of where
Government efforts to quash political protests became an
armed campaign. It could be argued that mercenaries were
used by the Government and implicated in human rights
violations, thus impeding the exercise of the right of the people
to self-determination. Such mercenary activities to support
Government action against civilians demonstrate that
mercenarism remains a significant threat to human rights.
However, as noted by the Commission of Inquiry and
highlighted by the Working Group, there is some uncertainty
about whether these foreign nationals meet the international
definition of a mercenary. More clarity is needed as to how,
when and for what purpose these troops were recruited. The
Working Group is concerned that although it is far from clear
that the foreign fighters in Libya were in fact mercenaries, they
are being held as such at various facilities around the country.
We also note the concern expressed by the Commission of
Inquiry regarding the conditions of detention of these fighters.
III. THE LACK OF A BROAD ADHERENCE TO THE
MERCENARY CONVENTIONS
The above recent examples highlight the importance of
combating mercenarism and mercenary-related activities. In
this regard, the Working Group urged States to adopt national
legislation to combat mercenarism and to ratify the
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. As of 15 November
2012, there were only 32 State Parties to the International
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries, and 53 to the OAU Convention for the
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa.
61. The following paragraphs rely heavily on Use of Mercenaries, 2011,
supra note 42, ¶¶ 59–62.
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IV. THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT ON PRIVATE MILITARY
AND SECURITY COMPANIES
The Montreux Document is a joint project of the Swiss
government and the ICRC, detailing the legal obligations and
offering best practices to ensure that private military and
security companies operating in armed conflicts comply with
applicable international law.62 Its approximately 70
recommendations, derive from State practice and include
verifying the track record of companies and examining the
procedures they use to vet their staff. States should also take
concrete measures to ensure that the personnel of private
military and security companies can be prosecuted when
serious breaches of the law occur.
The Montreux Document was developed with the
participation of governmental experts from Afghanistan,
Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany,
Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in
meetings convened in January and November 2006, November
2007, and April and September 2008. Representatives of civil
society and of the private military and security industry were
consulted.63
The Working Group has welcomed this effort to clarify
States’ commitments to international law and good practices,
and considered the Montreux Document useful in recalling
existing obligations of States under international human rights
and international humanitarian law. In particular, the
Working Group agreed with the principle, highlighted in the
document, that although Governments may choose to outsource
certain functions to private military and security companies,
States retain their obligations under international human
rights and humanitarian law. The Working Group believes,
however, that the Montreux Document fails to address the
regulatory gap in the responsibility of States vis-à-vis the
conduct of such companies and their employees as it presents
no assurance of enforceability of its good practices or the
62. The Montreux Document, 5, Sept. 17 2008, available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf.
63. The following paragraph draws heavily from The Montreux Document
on Private Military and Security Companies, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS
(Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/montreuxdocument-170908.htm.
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accountability of the endorsing States for the companies’
conduct.64
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
A. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND CONTENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT
Building on the foundations of the Montreux Document,
which clarified the responsibilities of States in relation to the
use of private military and security companies in armed
conflict, the private military and security industry, with the
support of the Government of Switzerland, developed the
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers in November 2010. 65 The Code establishes a common
set of principles for private military and security companies
that commits signatory companies to provide security services
in accordance with the rule of law, respect for human rights
and the interests of their clients.66
The Code of Conduct has proved popular with the industry
and as of 1 February 2013, 594 companies had signed onto it.67
While this is in itself a significant accomplishment, the process
of translating the Code’s principles into enforceable practical
standards (the Charter) has not yet been completed.68
B. THE DRAFT CHARTER OF THE OVERSIGHT MECHANISM FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE
SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS
On 16 January 2012, the Temporary Steering Committee
of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers issued the draft Charter of the Oversight
64. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mar. 2, 2007–Mar. 27,
2007, ¶¶ 42–48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/14; HRC, 10th Sess. (Jan. 21, 2009).
65. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers,
Nov.
9,
2010,
available
at
http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Co
mpany_Names.pdf.
66. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 12, 2011–Sept. 30,
2011, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/32; HRC, 18th Sess. (Jul. 4, 2011).
67. See The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers Signatories Companies (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_February_2013_-_Composite_List.pdf
(listing all the signatories to the ICOC).
68. See Explanatory Note on the Draft Charter on the Oversight
Mechanism for the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers,
May
16,
2012),
http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/Explanatory_Note.pdf.
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Mechanism for the Code for public consultation. As the
implementing mechanism of the Code, the Charter’s structure
and procedures have a critical bearing on the realization of the
Code’s principles, goals, and rules. The Charter’s effectiveness
is a litmus test for the legitimacy of the Code as a means of
improving the adherence of private military and security
companies to human rights standards.69
The Working Group expressed its continued support for the
process of developing the Code and the Charter as a means of
improving the adherence of private military and security
companies to international humanitarian and human rights
standards. The Working Group recognized the challenges of
developing the Charter and submitted extensive comments in
an effort to improve the draft text so that it would better fulfill
the promise of the Code to protect human rights in the context
of activities of private military and security companies.70
Generally, the Working Group believes that the Charter
should be modified to explicitly mainstream the protection of
human rights, which is the expressed goal of the Code and the
Charter.71 The Working Group recommended that the Charter
be brought further into compliance with the Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights developed by the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises (Ruggie Principles72) which were unanimously
endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4. 73
That framework is specifically embraced in the Code and the
Working Group believes the Guiding Principles set out the
basic parameters that an industry self-regulatory mechanism
should meet.74 The Working Group was aware of criticism75 of
69. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5,
2012, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012).
70. Id.
71. Id. ¶ 21
72. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, May 30, 2011–Jun. 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31; HRC; 17th
Sess. (Mar. 21, 2011) (advance unedited version).
73. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5,
2012, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012).
74. Id.
75. For an example of civil society statement see Joint Civil Society
Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
Jan.
2011,
available
at
http://www.escrnet.org/usr_doc/Joint_Statement_draftGPs_wendorsements-final-2.pdf.
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the Guiding Principles, in particular by non-governmental
organizations, but notes that such criticism does not concern
the usefulness of the Principles as setting out the basic
parameters for a self-regulatory mechanism such as the Code
and Charter.76
More specifically, the Working Group suggested several
ways to strengthen the Charter. For example, it should require
field audits. In addition, the third-party grievance mechanism
established by the Charter should be revised to address the
substance of third-party complaints (as envisaged in the Code)
rather than focusing only on the procedural compliance of
member companies. Lastly, the draft Charter contains
provisions that permit companies to refuse to share information
with monitoring mechanisms owing to contractual provisions or
the potential for parallel legal proceedings. While the Working
Group recognized the reasoning behind such provisions, it
believed that the provisions present significant loopholes that
could prevent the effective operation of Charter mechanisms
and that the inclusion of such provisions reflects the inherent
limitations of a self-regulatory mechanism, which can never
replace accountability through the law.
The Working Group welcomed the opportunity to
participate in the public consultation on the draft Charter and
hopes that its comments will assist the Temporary Steering
Committee to produce a final document that lives up to the
commitments made by the signatory companies to the Code.
Nonetheless, the Working Group considered the Code to
constitute but one element of an international system to meet
the challenges of regulating PMSCs. As a voluntary and selfregulatory tool, the Code by itself is clearly insufficient to
ensure comprehensive accountability for violations of human
rights and to provide remedies to victims. The Working Group
believed that the draft Charter’s shortcomings illustrate the
inherent limitations of a voluntary approach to regulation and
demonstrate the need for a binding international instrument.77
C. INDUSTRY–LED INITIATIVES
The American National Standards Institute approved and
issued in March 2012 its quality standard for private security
companies. The standard, which built on the Montreux
76. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5,
2012, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012).
77. Id. ¶ 23.
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Document and the International Code of Conduct, aimed to
provide requirements and guidance for a management system
for private security providers with auditable criteria consistent
with human rights, legal obligations and good practices. Those
involved in the development of the standard have indicated
that the goal is to undertake the process for becoming a
standard approved by the International Organization for
Standardization.78
VI. THE WORKING GROUP’S EFFORTS TO COLLECT
INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
A. RESEARCH INTO NATIONAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES79
The Working Group believed that it would be useful to
study and identify legislative approaches regarding the
activities of private military and security companies and to
assess the effectiveness of national legislation in protecting
human rights. Such a study would inform the Working Group’s
efforts to demonstrate the need for a legally binding
international instrument. In addition, it would assist in
identifying best practices and may inform future projects to
develop guidance for Member States seeking to regulate private
military and security companies.80
The Working Group has been conducting this work in
phases. First, it analyzed national legislation that was easily
accessible to develop preliminary conclusions on the models
used by States. Second, the Working Group has initiated a
survey to collect national legislation pertaining to private
military and security companies. It has requested Member
States to provide information in this respect and will
supplement the information collected with additional research.
Some of this research will be conducted in collaboration with
civil society partners.81
The Working Group will then analyze national legislation
on a region-by-region basis The first regional analysis, which
78. U.N. Secretary General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights an Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to SelfDetermination, GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/67/340 (Aug. 30, 2012).
79. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012- Nov. 5,
2012, ¶¶ 24–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012).
80. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5,
2012, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012).
81. Id. ¶ 25.
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will focus on Africa, will be included as part of the report of the
Working Group to the Human Rights Council at its twentyfourth session, in 2013. The other regional analyses will be
included in the subsequent reports of the Working Group to the
Human Rights Council.82
VII. THE USE OF PMSCS BY THE UNITED NATIONS
Over the past year, the Working Group has, on several
occasions, engaged in discussions with the United Nations
Department of Safety and Security regarding the development
of policies on the Organization’s use of armed private security
companies. On 28 August 2012, the Working Group provided
its written comments on the draft UN security policy manual
on armed private security companies, the UN Security
Operations Manual and the guidelines on the use of armed
services from private security companies. It reiterated its view,
expressed during its discussions with the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Safety and Security on 1 August 2012, that the
framework could be strengthened by further mainstreaming
human rights in the Organization’s policy and operational
documents. The Working Group intends to conduct an
assessment of the use of PMSCs by the United Nations in 2013
and is planning to hold a consultation on this issue in the
coming months.
VIII. THE CONTENT AND REASONS FOR PROMOTION OF
A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION
A. SELF-REGULATION CANNOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF
IMPUNITY
The International Code of Conduct signed in November
2010 by a number of PMSCs in essence recognizes that these
companies need standards. While the Code is an important
initiative and the Working Group is hopeful that it will raise
standards across the industry, it does not address the key issue
of accountability. As a non-governmental instrument which is
not legally-binding and is not backed by State sanctions, it
cannot address the essential human rights issue of
accountability for those PMSCs and their employees who
commit human rights abuses. In addition, the voluntary nature
of the Code of Conduct means that it cannot meet the goal of

82. Id. ¶ 26.
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ensuring that all PMSCs are covered. 83
B. NATIONAL REGULATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS
THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY
Regulatory tools to monitor the activities of PMSCs are
sorely lacking at the national level. Given the danger posed by
the types of activities carried out by PMSCs and the types of
environments in which they operate, at the very minimum,
States should register and license these companies and
regulate the types of functions that they can perform.84 They
should also monitor their activities and ensure that they have
the ability to prosecute where necessary in order to ensure
accountability.85 Only a handful of countries currently have
legislation that meets these minimum criteria.86 Even where
national regulation has been adopted, it has serious
limitations. The transnational nature of much PMSC activity
means that some PMSCs can easily escape national
regulation.87 Only an international convention could ensure
that participating States apply minimum standards to regulate
PMSC activities. Moreover, national prosecutions have rarely
been successful because of the difficulty in identifying
witnesses and collecting evidence abroad.88 In light of these
limitations, the problem of impunity needs to be address at the
international level.89
C. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PMSCS
PMSCs, as non-State actors, are not subject to
international human rights obligations. Moreover, employees of
PMSCs, even in cases when they conduct mercenary-like
activities, cannot usually be considered as mercenaries under
the definitions set out in either the Geneva Conventions or the
1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries.90
83. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, May 23, 2012–May 27,
2012, ¶¶ 5-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG/10/CRP.1; HRC, 1st Sess. (May 17, 2011).
84. Id. ¶ 26.
85. Id. ¶ 24.
86. Id. ¶ 26.
87. Id. ¶ 27.
88. Id. ¶ 28.
89. Id. ¶ 31.
90. Id. ¶ 8.
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Although States are obliged under international human
rights law to take appropriate measures and to exercise due
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate, and redress the harm
caused by PMSCs, in practice that obligation is rarely fulfilled.
In light of the current lack of accountability of PMSCs for their
activities, it is imperative to enumerate the obligations of
States vis-à-vis PMSCs in a legally binding document in a more
explicated and detailed manner.91
D. VICTIMS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE
REMEDY
In addition to the need to hold PMSCs and their
employees accountable for their actions, victims of human
rights violations involving PMSCs should be able to exercise
their right to an effective remedy. Ideally, they should be able
to do so locally. However, victims often live in countries with
weak judicial systems. Even where victims are able to bring
cases to the courts in the countries where PMSCs are
established, such cases are rarely successful for the same
reasons that criminal prosecutions often fail (availability of
witnesses, lack of evidence, etc.). An international convention
would reaffirm the right of victims to an effective remedy,
create an obligation of mutual legal assistance and provide an
international avenue for those who cannot exercise this right at
the national level.92
There are some standards in international law applicable
to the activities of PMSCs, but the regime is far from complete.
First, although there are indications of strong disapproval of
the involvement of private actors in combat activities, there is
no clear international prohibition. Second, while it is clear that
States have the general international obligation to ensure
respect for humanitarian law and human rights vis-à-vis
PMSCs, the content of such obligations has not been explicated.
The Working Group believes that developing such content is
critical for PMSCs because many of their activities pose
particular risks for human rights.93
While the Working Group has consistently encouraged
States to adopt national legislation to regulate PMSCs and
believes such regulation to be essential, it seems unlikely that
91. Id. ¶ 19.
92. Id. ¶ 10.
93. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Aug. 13, 2012–Aug. 17,
2012, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/2/CRP.1; HRC; 2d Sess. (Aug. 6, 2012).
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ad hoc efforts alone will be successful. Because PMSCs operate
transnationally—they are often located in one country, recruit
employees outside their home countries and deploy them in yet
another country—it is not enough if only a few countries adopt
legislation regulating their activities. So, although national
legislation is a critical piece of the regulatory puzzle, an
international convention serves as vehicle for making sure that
such legislation is adopted by all the countries affected by
PMSC activity and that the domestic legislation adheres to
certain minimum standards.94
Finally, an international convention serves to highlight
the commitment of the international community to address the
issue of PMSCs. We often face situations where robust national
legislation is vital and we use international mechanisms to get
us there. For example, the attacks of September 11th
highlighted the danger posed by terrorist attacks carried out by
non-State actors. A critical part of preventing such attacks was
to ensure that countries adopted and enforced national
legislation.95 The route chosen was, however, an international
one: the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to ensure
that States passed legislation to control and criminalize their
activities.96
For all of these reasons, the Working Group believes that
an international convention is the most efficient solution to the
challenge of regulating PMSCs.97
IX. CONCLUSION
The Working Group has expressed deep concerns about the
alleged involvement of mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire in killing
and injuring civilians, the recruitment of children and in
looting private property.98 It urged Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to
identify, arrest, and promptly prosecute the mercenaries
responsible for violations of human rights and to take the
measures necessary to prevent the recruitment and training of
mercenaries, with special emphasis on children, on their
94. Id. ¶ 37.
95. Id. ¶ 38.
96. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
97. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Aug. 13, 2012–Aug. 17,
2012, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/2/CRP.1; HRC; 2d Sess. (Aug. 6, 2012).
98. U.N. Secretary General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating
Human Rights an Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to SelfDetermination, GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/67/340, ¶ 28 (Aug. 30, 2012).
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territories.99 The Working Group further requested the
President of Côte d’Ivoire, in his capacity as Chair of the
Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic
Community of West African States, to tackle the threats to
human rights posed by mercenary activities in the subregion.100
The Working Group has also expressed concerns about the
measures taken by the Government of Libya against alleged
mercenaries, their detention conditions and their rights to a
fair trial. The Working Group urged the Libyan authorities to
charge detainees being held in connection to the conflict for
their involvement in specific criminal acts and to release those
against whom there is no evidence of crime.101 It requested
Libya to ensure that conditions of detention of persons accused
or suspected of being mercenaries comply with applicable
international law, including proper treatment of detainees,
access to lawyers and family, and the ability to lodge
complaints of torture and ill-treatment.102
Given the risk to human rights of the activities of private
military and security companies, the Working Group welcomed
efforts by States to continue discussing the possibility of
international regulation, in addition to the progress at the
regional and national levels and industry-led initiatives. The
Working Group is of the view that further research into
effective national regulatory strategies is needed and called on
Member States to respond to its request to collect all national
legislation relevant to private military and security companies
to facilitate analysis by multiple stakeholders.103
The Working Group welcomed efforts to clarify obligations
under international law and identify good practices, such as the
Montreux Document, and industry self-regulation initiatives,
such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers.104 It urged States to recognize these
initiatives as complementary to, but no substitutes for, strong
international and national regulatory frameworks. In the view
of the Working Group a comprehensive, legally binding
international regulatory instrument is the best way to ensure
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶
Id. ¶

70.
71.
72.
73.
75.
77.
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adequate protection of human rights. The Working Group
therefore encourages all States to participate actively in the
work of the intergovernmental working group established by
the Human Rights Council with a view to considering the
possibility of an international instrument for the regulation of
private military and security companies. Finally, the Working
Group encourages States to ensure the investigation and
prosecution of violations of international human rights law
involving private military and security companies, to guarantee
accountability for human right violations and provide an
effective remedy for victims.105

105. Id. ¶ 79.

